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Science necessarily involves philosophical approaches to both make sense of its findings 
and provide purposeful direction for research. Biology as the scientific approach to the study of 
life is, therefore, bound to philosophy, especially regarding questions about the nature and 
treatment of life. The cell theory has effectively been a scientific grounding point for the former1 
since the nineteenth century, and it has certainly been advantageous for the rapid advancement of 
biological research and medical applications. Still, even today scientists are philosophically 
divided on the nature of life. Many biologists would likely argue that the difficult philosophical 
questions underlying their own discipline—for example, the problem of how one can logically 
(i.e. not just descriptively) account for something that is recognized and distinguished as “living” 
arising solely from “non-living” or abiotic components—have no place in formal scientific or 
biological research because they are not directly testable questions.  However, while it may be 
true that these questions are not directly testable, researchers in scientific disciplines should not 
dismiss such inquiry entirely. Biological research relies—at least legally and financially, if not 
ethically—upon effective communication of its knowledge and application of that knowledge to 
non-scientific audiences, and awareness of these philosophical questions and proper treatment of 
them is essential for proper communication of the sciences to society. In particular, such 
philosophical questions are often what motivates and engages new learners to scientific 
disciplines, and it is often the case that the more one learns, the more questions one has. For 
                                                 
1 The cell theory, credited to Schwann, Schleiden, and Virchow, states that: 
• Organisms are composed of cells. 
• The cell is the basic unit of life.  
• All cells come from preexisting cells  
 
As should be obvious, this theory provides descriptive parameters to account for what we recognize as living 
organisms.  Without a sufficient account of the origin of the first cell of an evolutionary lineage as an exception to 
the rule, the third clause is at risk of an infinite regression. 
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example, what constitutes the recognition of a cell or organism as something “alive” and 
individual, something that is more than a mere sum of non-living parts? Biology recognizes that 
such a distinction between life and non-life exists in nature, but largely still fails to account 
satisfactorily for the seemingly paradoxical claim noted above.  Thus, as biologists come to 
better acknowledge and understand the present philosophical inquiry concerning their content 
knowledge, the bonds of education and service between biology and society are strengthened.2 
Tangentially, it is worth noting that even founders of modern science and stark proponents of 
materialism—such as John Locke—have argued that the link between our sensory experiences of 
the natural world and our knowledge of it is not necessarily “direct” by any means,3 and modern 
sensory physiology would support this view. One might thus beg the question of how ‘direct’ our 
knowledge of the natural world can and should be.  
 Under the current paradigm, scientific knowledge is held to be the authority of our 
understanding of the natural world, but it cannot in its current state address questions of purpose 
or value in this domain.  However, the scientific project assumes that there are objectively real 
values—such as human curiosity, consistency, and the pursuing knowledge of the natural world, 
to name a few—and purposes to describe reality. So, as it stands, science has a metaphysical 
foundation of values which it fails to validate, being limited primarily to descriptions of the 
physical world. Scientism—the claim that scientific knowledge is the most authoritative and/or 
                                                 
2 This is especially relevant today with controversy over socioscientific issues such as climate change and stem cell 
research. 
3From these perspectives, the link between objects of the material world and the ideas or descriptive accounts we 
form of them from sensory experiences is not evidently one of necessity. Locke, for example, has argued that we 
only have a relative notion of substance rather than a positive one (Locke 1997—II xxiii 2). Consider something 
measured and quantified in science like charge. It is inferred from our sensory experiences and from physical 
investigations that such a thing exists in nature and operates in  an ordered and describable way, but can we really 
say what such a thing is? Sure, charge comes from protons and electrons, and these particles get their charge 
presumably from something else, but what essentially is charge? A similar question can be raised for mass. 
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the only valuable knowledge—is thus incoherent.4 The question then is whether and how science 
and philosophy can somehow be merged in such a way that scientific knowledge is 
contextualized and applied towards a search for answers to these deeper questions. The rapidly 
emerging field of biosemiotics strives to meet this aspiration. 
Marcello Barbieri is one biosemiotician who argues against the dominant paradigm in 
science generally and biology especially.  In his view, current scientific practice is burdened by 
physicalism, as described in science and philosophy at least since the mid-60s by Chargoff and 
others (Barbieri, 2007). Barbieri describes physicalism or the physicalist thesis as one which 
attempts to account for all phenomena solely in terms of their physical quantities. While this 
approach has employed reductionism to great effect in furthering our understanding of natural 
causes for phenomena5, there are significant problems with a physicalist scientific approach. 
First, the critique of science in the preceding paragraphs still stands—science is limited to 
descriptive causal explanations, but for scientific findings to have significance, human ingenuity 
must come into play for their interpretation and application. Without this broadening perspective, 
for example, we would have no concept of evolution, the most unifying theory in biology. It is 
difficult to imagine a modern biological discipline with current technological advancements and 
no concept of evolution—indeed, some might say impossible, for scientific findings influence 
the development of technology and vice versa in an ongoing cycle. And it must be admitted that 
the physicalist thesis is quite radical, and Barbieri’s critique of the dominant paradigm may be 
                                                 
4 A critique often credited to Nietzche in philosophy of science, though his critique of science is more complex 
(Babich 2010). 
5 With advancements in technology, science is now capable of exploring (albeit indirectly) the natural world on the 
subatomic level, yet this is a scale which is almost incomprehensibly smaller than the scale of what is detectable by 
and relatable to the human senses; one is left to wonder whether we are approaching the boundaries of what is 
knowable at the physical level.  Moreover, as the complexity of scientific findings increases in this regard, so too 




unfair. But, as a theory which might attempt to back the scientific project—and, perhaps even 
more dangerous, as a mood which subtly pervades and is propagated by scientific practice and 
culture—such stark flaws must be pointed out. The physicalist approach is necessarily limited by 
its reductionism to exclude any synthesizing of broader understandings from the scientific body 
of knowledge. For biology, were this conceptualization to be carried out to its extremes, the 
phenomena of each organism would appear to be isolated, from the microscopic to the 
macroscopic level. Every act of DNA transcription and translation to a gene product would seem 
independent from another, and ecology would cease to exist as a scientific discipline. 
Secondly, it presents an effectively nihilistic outlook.6 This is because science through 
the physicalist approach not only distances itself from searching for any sort of transcendental or 
supernatural explanation of natural phenomena but discredits them entirely.  In other words, if 
nothing beyond the realm of physical interactions is held to be ‘objectively real’ or of any 
fundamental importance for explaining phenomena except in a very superficial sense, the 
tendency may be to assume that there is no objective meaning or purpose in nature, and that life 
at any level is thus aimless. The physicalist thesis may permit only wonder at the complex depth 
of the human mind, the vast diversity of life and biotic processes on earth, and the very 
possibility of communication. It cannot thoroughly explain why these things occur; it can only 
concede that they do somehow because of complex physical and chemical interactions which 
science strives to describe. In fact, the physicalist thesis holds that there is no why—no 
overarching explanation beyond physical interactions. In other words, the physicalist thesis 
                                                 
6 The view that modern society and science are trending towards nihilism is another of Nietzsche’s famous remarks. 
A distinction between two types of nihilism is made clear by Bernard Reginster, where nihilism as disorientation is 
the view that there is no objective meaning, purpose, or values that are somehow a priori to life (2006). Nihilism as 
despair is the view that there are such objective values, but that they are ultimately unattainable. The former would 
seem to apply here. 
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prevents one from making any broader connections because even these connections in principle 
must be reducible to only purposeless physical interactions. As a scientific approach, this 
nihilistic embrace is paradoxical because science as a whole assumes that the universe is ordered 
and knowable and strives to describe its processes—the same applies in particular to biology and 
life processes. Simultaneously, any human values—including the most noble quests for 
knowledge and understanding—are undermined. 
This is what Barbieri means when he says that modern science does not know how to 
cope with the meaning that scientists themselves and society at large nevertheless attribute to 
scientific discoveries (2007). He points out a paradox at the core of biology in the following way. 
The genetic code is held to be the fundamental basis of all life on Earth; according to the 
physicalist thesis, however, it is at most a “metaphor” constructed to make sense of complex but 
objectively meaningless physical interactions. Here, I would add that even the recognition of 
something as being meaningfully ‘alive’ and originating from abiotic components is paradoxical 
under a solely physicalist view. Thus, with the physicalist thesis rendered unsatisfactory, science 
is left in want of some other theoretical approach to back its project. Therefore, to realize this 
goal and to push the scientific understanding of life, a synthesis of the knowledge and methods 
of biology and philosophy becomes necessary. Alone, neither field is capable of effecting 
significant change in the current scientific practice, for biology in a strictly scientific sense lacks 
the methods, and philosophy lacks access to requisite knowledge and traction in the scientific 
community. 
Biosemiotics is perhaps the most significant attempt to bridge the gap between science 
and philosophy since they started to diverge in the modern era. This emerging field attempts to 
find evidence for natural sources of inherent and objective meaning or purpose in biologic life. 
7 
 
Proving this search to be futile or a worthwhile endeavor is not within the scope of this paper. 
Rather, this paper is an attempt to formally introduce biosemiotics and how the methods of 
biology and philosophy are synthesized therein to the scientific community it should concern the 
most. Furthermore, potential merits and detriments of this approach will be examined through 
analysis of the views of Marcello Barbieri who proposed in 1986 that cells have “ribotypes”7 
which derive from the evolutionary impacts of early ribozymal entities and that the cell is a 
trinity of ribotype, genotype, and phenotype. I will first present a brief account of biosemiotics in 
general, noting how it came to be and what some of its prominent views are. I will then narrow 
the scope of my focus to the views of Barbieri on the nature of the cell. I will offer a critical 
examination of Barbieri’s semiotic model, presenting its strengths and weaknesses in its attempt 
to make biosemiotics relevant and viable in application to scientific research. In my opinion, 
Barbieri’s view is potentially of critical importance for the direction of biological research and 
education, having many component points worthy of both philosophical consideration and 
scientific testing. While his basis for the argument of a cell’s ribotype as its codemaker may not 
yet be definitively shown, the argument for a cell as a triadic entity seems self-consistent and 
plausible; beyond this, it is an interesting and radical conception which could reform our 
understanding of the origin of life. Still, even if a cell should be considered as a trinity of 
genotype, ribotype, and phenotype as opposed to a duality of genotype and phenotype, the 
argument for the cell as a self-contained semiotic system which produces its own meaning seems 
open for debate. Ultimately, I see this debate as one of which biologists should be made aware 
and to which they should contribute.  
 
                                                 
7 This will be explained and expanded upon in a later section, but a cell’s ribotype , defined as the ribonucleoprotein 
system of the cell, is essentially classified according to whether it has a prokaryotic (70s) or eukaryotic (80s) 
ribosomal system.  
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II. Biosemiotics in general 
 
Biosemiotics is an attempt to reform our understanding of living systems by breaking 
with the view that life processes are essentially meaningless and mechanistic (Mullins, 2017).  
This is accomplished through the argument that “semiotic causation” and “semiotic scaffolding” 
plays a pivotal role in nearly every aspect of both the internal and external dynamics of 
organisms, from cellular processes like metabolism and reproduction to broad scale ecological 
processes.  One of the clearest and most succinct accounts of this view is offered by Eliseo 
Fernandez (2014) in the following manner:   
 
Within each living being there is an unceasing deployment of signaling 
interactions between and among its constituent parts. These internal exchanges 
are regulated and coordinated with the assistance of another equally complex 
semiotic interplay. The second interactional traffic takes place between the whole 
organism and the entities and events occurring within its habitat. 
 
To summarize, there are at least two cases of semiosis occurring for every organism: one within 
the organism, and one between the organism and its environment.8 Both of these cases are held 
to be of equal philosophical merit for the production of new biologic meaning. The richness of 
this view becomes clear when terms like “semiotic causation” and “semiotic scaffolding” are 
unpacked.  To do so, however, semiotic theory and the significant application of the theory to 
                                                 
8 For the purposes of this paper, the former is of primary concern. For any biosemiotics theory to have merit in 
modern biology, it would have to first demonstrate plausibility at the microscopic level of the cell, the fundamental 
unit of life. To illustrate the proposed applicability of biosemiotics to all biologic study, however, macroscopic cases 
of semiosis will be discussed where possible.  
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biological systems must first be made clear. At its core, a semiotic system is one that is 
concerned with the production of meaning (i.e. semiosis). As such, it takes the fact that meaning 
does exist as granted, and the ability for organisms to communicate in any sense is a testament to 
that. It should be of no surprise, then, that the theories which arose to account for this 
phenomenon were initially concerned rather heavily with linguistics and providing a 
sophisticated account of language, for it is the form of communication with which we are most 
intimately familiar. 
 
The Saussure-Florkin Model 
One semiotic model was developed by Ferdinand de Saussure, which Barbieri describes 
as a “duality of ‘signifier and signified’ or ‘sign and meaning’” (2007). In other words, a 
semiotic system according to Saussure has two essential components—namely, the sign, 
whatever it may be, and the meaning of that sign or what it represents. A good way to explain the 
basic relationship is through linguistics with the example of a phoneme.  Phonemes are often 
depicted by a single letter or a unique pairing of letters, which translates to some vocal utterance. 
In this example, a particular phoneme would be considered the “sign” or “signifier,” and the 
vocal utterance it translates to would be the “signified.” However, this two-part account of a 
semiotic system is still unsatisfactory; being merely descriptive, it leaves open room for debate 
as to what links the two parts and how meaning is produced. We are still left in need of a way to 
distinguish semiotic systems, which are meaningful, from those that are not. In other words, what 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be a case of genuine semiosis? Still, this 
view was significant in early biosemiotics as shown by the Florkin-Saussure model of 1974 
which analogized “sign” to genotype and “signified” to phenotype in cellular systems (Barbieri, 
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2007). Barbieri points out that, in stark opposition to what was to come later in contemporary 
biosemiotics, Florkin declared that a bioseme carries no meaning, rendering the application of 
Saussure’s model useless from a practical standpoint. For the sake of communicating the 
conceptual links of the model, however, a biological sign at an ecological scale could be 
something like an abundance of resources for an organism. The signified aspect in this case 
would be the habitability of the environment to that organism, and perhaps others.9 
 
The Peirce-Sebeok Model 
Another major semiotic model—indeed, the most influential and commonly referenced in 
biosemiotic scholarship—comes from Charles Peirce. Peirce’s philosophy includes interpretation 
as an essential component to the semiotic system, making it a triadic one of “sign, object, and 
interpretant” (Barbieri, 2007). To explain by way of linguistics again, consider morphemes—the 
simplest units of meaning in language. Any self-contained word, like run, is a free morpheme.10 
So, under Peirce’s semiotic account, the sign in an arbitrary case could be a particular morpheme 
(e.g. the word run—it could be written or verbal) because it is the interpretable part of the 
relationship. The object or referent in this case would be the thing or concept the morpheme 
represents in the language (e.g. the actual form of exercise or motion whereby a terrestrial 
organism propels itself to some increased velocity through the contact of its limbs with the 
ground), and the “interpretant” is the meaningful effect produced by the act of interpretation. For 
example, one might see or hear the word “run” (i.e. the sign) in some context, like in a training 
                                                 
9 Presumably, the organisms are made ‘aware’ of the signified aspect in some sense, but how this is accomplished is  
not at this point explicitly clear, hence the need for a more refined model.  
 
10 As distinguished from bound morphemes which cannot function independently . Bound morphemes exist in the 
form of prefixes and suffixes; they affix new meaning to a word by adding plurality or action (e.g. the suffixes –s 
and –ing would change ‘run’ to ‘runs’ or ‘running’). 
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regimen for track and field. One then meaningfully ‘links’ the sign to one’s experience through 
the interpretant, in this case by performing the act of running for training—interpretation in 
context determines the appropriate response. Accounting for the production of meaning as a 
semiotic process in the context of mental activity and language as described above is in fact a 
deeply complex philosophical endeavor11, despite the oversimplification for purposes of analogy.  
For this reason, an exhaustive investigation of Peirce’s philosophy is beyond the scope of this 
paper, however useful it might be in critiquing the claims of biosemiotics. What is especially of 
note from Peirce’s semiotics is that—whether correctly interpreted and applied to biology or 
not—a sort of natural teleology arises in Peirce’s semiotic system (Mullins, 2017). 
The Peirce-Sebeok model, proposed in 1963 and developed into the 80s, was the first 
attempt to apply this understanding to biology and is still a popular model in biosemiotics today 
(Barbieri, 2007).  Sebeok held that all cases of semiosis are triadic, and that interpretation is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for something to be a semiosis—in other words, for something 
to be meaningful or have purpose.  According to this model, an organism’s genotype is a sign 
whose object is the organism’s phenotype, similar to the Saussure-Florkin model. The difference 
is that Sebeok holds that there is a self-contained act of interpretation in the system. Thus, at the 
most fundamental biologic level, the ribosomal machinery of the cell serves as the source of 
interpretation of the genetic code’s meaning which enables the translation of the genetic code. 
Interpretation in this case must necessarily be distinguished from a mental act, as it would be 
absurd to attribute mental activity to a mere molecular structure. So, in what sense would Sebeok 
say a ribosome ‘interprets’ the genetic code? Well, it processes the information contained in 
some portion of the genetic code and forms a product, and it does this in a consistent and 
                                                 
11 For those interested in the philosophy of language and meaning , I would suggest reading Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations especially. 
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predictable way. A computer program, for example, can be coded to mechanistically ‘interpret’ 
some input and reliably produce some output according to some algorithm—perhaps 
interpretation in the case of ribosomal activity is analogous to this. However, in the case of the 
computer program example, would it not be more reasonable to say that the original meaning of 
the program came not from the disposition of its mechanistic interpretation, but from the one 
who coded it? 
In the contemporary biosemiotic view, the telos of any semiotic system is the production 
of an interpretant, and this can be realized as the formation of new signs or of habits and 
dispositions, among other things (Mullins, 2017). Biosemioticians thus apply a teleology to 
living systems and argue for a “dispositional account of causation,” which is, in some sense, a 
sophisticated way of reintroducing to modern science Aristotle’s notions of resident causal 
powers or intrinsic properties. Fernandez (2015) offers the following summation of the 
dispositionalist account:  
 
According to the dispositionalist standpoint an event A causes an event B when 
causal powers (which are latent in A) manifest themselves in a well-defined 
manner to produce B, contingent upon the occurrence of activating circumstances 
of a well-defined kind. For instance, a match has an intrinsic disposition to ignite 
which does not become manifest under usual conditions. When specific triggering 
circumstances occur (friction, dryness, etc.) the disposition to ignite manifests 




So, in the biosemiotic view, the habits of organisms are the dispositions “to respond in a 
particular patterned manner when some particular thing or process…triggers that particular 
response.” These dispositions are the interpretants of biological semiotic systems (Mullins, 
2017). One biosemiotician, Jesper Hoffmeyer (2007), suggests the following:   
 
The apparently purposeful nature of living systems is obtained through a 
sophisticated network of semiotic controls whereby biochemical, physiological 
and behavioral processes become tuned to the needs of the systems. The operation 
of these semiotic controls takes place and is enabled across a diversity of levels. 
Such semiotic controls may be distinguished from ordinary deterministic control 
mechanisms through an inbuilt anticipatory capacity based on a distinct kind of 
causation that I call…‘semiotic causation’ to denote the bringing about of changes 
under the guidance of interpretation in a local context. 
 
So, according to Hoffmeyer, the telos of living systems results from semiotic causation, and this 
involves interpretation in accordance with the Peirce-Sebeok model. Semiotic causation, then, 
appears to be opposed to the causation of abiotic systems because abiotic causation does not 
involve interpretation or habit formation. One of the strongest supporting examples of this in 
biology may be the discovery of anticipatory cephalic phase responses of the internal milieu of 
organisms—especially of the intestinal tract and circulatory systems—which enable control of 
things like blood-glucose levels in the face of a discontinuous supply of nutrients (Power and 
Schulkin, 2008).  For Hoffmeyer, the ability of organisms to anticipate changes in environmental 
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or internal conditions and survive through responses to such stimuli is predicated upon this 
notion of semiotic causation as being normative for all living systems.  
Regarding semiotic scaffolding, Fernandez (2015) quotes recent efforts of Favareau and 
Kull to clarify the term. Favareau offers the following account. 
 
Semiotic Scaffolding consists in biologically instantiated sign relations 
interlocking with and reinforcing one another, and by so doing, providing 
directionality towards and away from other sign relations in the network, through 
the dynamic emergence and canalization of semiotic pathway biases and 
constraints. Such ongoing semiodynamic re-adjustment enables new scaffolds and 
new pathways within and between scaffolds to arise, increasing semiosic capacity 
exponentially. 
 
Kull’s suggestion is as follows. 
 
Semiosis as an active meaning-seeking-making process results often with the 
building of some relatively static or even quite solid structures that somehow 
embed in themselves the findings of that active searching-event of semiosis. The 
resulting structure is scaffolding. It canalizes further behavior. It is the frame for 
habits. 
 
What I make out of these two somewhat nebulous accounts is that semiotic scaffolding in 
biological systems often—though perhaps not always—has to do with the actual physical 
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structures that make interpretation and processing of internal or environmental information and 
stimuli possible. At one level, examples of semiotic scaffolding could be structures associated 
with DNA transcription and translation, like ribosomal complexes and transcription factors; at 
another level, examples could be structures associated with autocrine, paracrine, and endocrine 
signaling between cells; even further examples could be whole tissues and organ systems, and 
perhaps even trends towards cephalization or various body symmetries.  Each of these could be 
taken as semiotic manifestations of the processes by which living systems meaningfully interact 
with information both internally and externally. In addition, the evolution of these structures 
would in-turn influence the evolution of increasingly sophisticated responses.  Hoffmeyer’s 
(2007) remarks on semiotic scaffolding seem to support this interpretation:  
 
History thus not only matters to the cell, but literally operates inside the cell 
through the structural couplings—or semiotic scaffolds—that it has served to 
build into the system. And this is exactly what distinguishes living systems from 
non-living systems: the presence in the former of historically created semiotic 
interaction mechanisms which have no counterpart in the latter. 
 
Though Hoffmeyer focuses on the cell’s interior in the above quote, the idea of scaffolding is 
applicable to the structures of all living systems; as he says, “The operation of these semiotic 
controls takes place and is enabled across a diversity of levels.” Thus, according to semiotic 
theory, the semiotic scaffolding manifested in biological structures reflect the telos of living 
systems to interpret information and respond through semiotic causation and serve as framework 
for the evolution of increasingly complex and adept responses.  
16 
 
But is the telos of a living system unique by case, or is there something richer about this 
view that is somehow fundamental to life? As described thus far, the particular habits formed by 
living things would certainly differ. However, Hoffmeyer argues for an aspect of this habit 
formation that is common to all living systems (2008). In his view, all living creatures are not 
just surviving in accordance with natural selection and responses to their environment—they are 
striving also12. This striving seems to be concordant with the emphasis Michael Polanyi places in 
his works as well on the achievements and flourishing of living beings (Mullins, 2017).  From a 
scientific perspective, though, it is difficult to see how this “striving” is distinct from mere 
anthropomorphizing of living systems. It is clear that biosemiotics would argue for a deeper 
understanding of the term, but it may not yet be able to express this in a testable way to the 
scientific community. As Hoffmeyer himself notes, “making scientifically responsible sense of 
this “striving” is one of the challenges that the emerging field of biosemiotics sets out to accept.”  
In short, then, the carrying out of a habit or disposition of an organism is seen, in some 
general sense, as an act of interpretation of the organism’s surroundings, which is held to be a 
telos of living systems. The Peirce-Sebeok model argues in a similar way for a disposition of the 
cellular ribosomal machinery. Furthermore, Hoffmeyer explicitly states that “biological 
communication is more than just machine- like exchange of information,” and this is “because the 
sign embraces a process of interpretation” (2008). To biosemiotics, then, interpretation is 
something more than the previous computer program analogy permits, though how exactly this is 
to be argued is not quite clear. For while interpretation may be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for recognizing a case in which meaning is present, it seems less plausible that this 
                                                 
12 Philosophically, this seems to have echoes of existential philosophers like Nietzsche, Heideggar, and Sartre. 
Nietzsche’s concept of will-to-power as a fundamental and normative will of all life to thrive through the exercise 
and expansion of ability may be especially applicable here to making sense of this “striving.” Still, this notion seems 
far from any scientifically testable justification. 
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would be responsible for the production of it, as with the computer program analogy. At the 
semiotic level between organism and habitat, like with the example of abundant resources used 
previously, this seems to be somewhat less of an issue; mental phenomena are also present in 
animals to some extent, and this would presumably be sufficient for the production of meaning in 
their responses to environments—the interpretants are the dispositions of the animals themselves. 
Still, what about semiotic interplays between whole organisms and environments in cases 
without well-documented mental phenomena and complicated neural networks—plants and 
bacteria, for example? How are the interpretations of their semiotic interplays fundamentally 
different from mechanistic information processing? Clarifying this matter is still a very 
challenging area for biosemiotics, especially with regard to cellular processes; Barbieri takes a 
somewhat different approach. 
 
III. The Biosemiotic Model of Marcello Barbieri 
 
The Ribotype Theory 
 
Perhaps in anticipation of critiques similar to the challenge raised for the role of 
interpretation in the previous section, Barbieri’s semiotic model differs quite significantly from 
that of the Peirce-Sebeok model.  His argument for inherent meaning in a cell is fundamentally 
based on what he originally proposed in 1986 as the Ribotype Theory in which he argues that 
cellular “ribotypes” are evidence for natural codemakers rather than mere interpreters.  The 
Ribotype Theory has three major components. First, it proposes a plausible case for the origin of 
the first cells, with their being shaped and brought about by the pre-cellular evolution of early 
ribonucleoproteins—what he calls “ribosoids”—and their quasi-replicative abilities. Secondly, it 
provides a rough sketch for a potential course of cellular evolution from the protocellular stage to 
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the prokaryotes and eukaryotes observable in the world today which serves to explain, for 
example, why prokaryotes and eukaryotes differ in ribosomal makeup (i.e. 70-S vs 80-S 
ribosomes, respectively) and in their transcription / translation processes. Thirdly, assuming that 
the two above cases or something very near it is true, the Ribotype Theory provides a radically 
different perspective on the nature of the cell than what is currently taken for granted in modern 
biology. Interestingly, the Ribotype Theory can be viewed as a special case and extension of the 
RNA World Hypothesis13 that, if true, leads to a novel conclusion about the nature of the cell. In 
this conclusion, Barbieri breaks from the traditional view of cells and organisms as dualities of 
genotype and phenotype, offering instead a view of cells as trinities of genotype, “ribotype,” and 
phenotype (1986). Interestingly, Barbieri argues that his account on the origin of life is better 
than others like the genotype theory and phenotype theory because it avoids the “chicken and the 
egg” paradox. In other words, due to their mutual dependence in living systems today, it remains 
unclear whether and how a genetic system of information storage could have originated before 
the structural development of the referenced information and vice versa. Barbieri attempts to 
address this issue through a semiotic account which proposes a role for ribosomal precursors in 
cellular evolution. 
 In this perspective, the cellular ribotype is considered to be a separate entity from 
genotype and phenotype that functions to bridge the “one-dimensional” flow of information from 
the genetic code to the three-dimensional actualization of that information in the form of proteins 
(Barbieri, 1986).  This may be a step towards clarifying the issue with interpretation noted above. 
More importantly, however, Barbieri argues that these ribosomal complexes are not just 
                                                 
13 First proposed in 1962 by Alexander Rich and conceptually supported by the contributions of Francis Crick and 
Carl Woese, the RNA World Hypothesis states that RNA was likely utilized by the earliest life on Earth to store 
genetic information and to catalyze chemical reactions  (Neveu, Kim, & Benner, 2013). 
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translation mechanisms for living systems, but that they were of primary importance in bringing 
about the system in the first place—even more so than DNA.14 Furthermore, he holds that 
biologic differences in ribosoidal production were the impetus for the characteristic differences 
that allow for the modern distinction of prokaryotes from eukaryotes. In other words, he argues 
that prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells first arose from natural selection of ribosomal biogenesis 
mechanisms with the statement “one ribotype, one cell type” (Barbieri, 1986). The biological 
rationale of this account and perspective will be flushed out below in some detail, highlighting 
the potential application of modern biological research to test this theory.  
Prokaryotes use 70-S ribosomal systems and have their origin of transcription linked in 
both time and space to the origin of translation; the two can happen simultaneously (Barbieri, 
1986). Eukaryotes use 80-S ribosomal systems and have their origin of transcription separated in 
time and space from their origin of translation (nucleus vs. cytoplasm). In the Ribotype Theory, 
Barbieri makes a case for ribogenesis mechanisms causing the evolution of this dichotomy, such 
that 70-S type ribosomes are evolutionarily streamlined versions of 80-S type ribosomes. 
According to Barbieri, the dichotomy that is observed between prokaryotes and eukaryotes 
cannot be explained in full by the conclusion put forth by Carl Woese in 1980 that as the 
molecular weight of the ribosomal matrix increases, so does the accuracy of the translation; 70-S 
ribosomes and 80-S ribosomes differ in weight on average by nearly 2 MDa but have relatively 
equal translational accuracies (Barbieri, 1986). Instead, Barbieri thinks that the reason why 
prokaryotes with 80-S ribosomes and eukaryotes with 70-S ribosomes are not observed is due to 
natural selection on the ribosomal production processes. Specifically, his hypothesis is that the 
biogenesis mechanisms of the 80-S ribosomes in eukaryotes allows for their transport from the 
                                                 
14 Here, Barbieri comments on and dissents from the assertions of those like Richard Dawkins that organisms are 
DNA’s way of producing DNA. 
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nucleus to the cytoplasm, which prokaryotic mechanisms would not be able to accomplish 
(Barbieri, 1986). This separation in time and space of transcription and translation would allow 
for compression and compartmentalization of a larger genome, a greater diversity in cell types, 
and eventually multicellularity, evolutionarily balancing the increased energy expenditure for 
these ribotypes. In addition, Barbieri proposes that prokaryotes would be able to function with 
80-S ribosomes, but that in their case, natural selection favored less energy expenditure, 
streamlining the ribonucleoprotein system and restricting the size of the genome. Thus, Barbieri 
views the two major ribotype systems that we see today as a sort of natural dichotomy.15 In 
addition, a critical factor upon which Barbieri’s theory hinges is recognition of the comparatively 
greater metabolic resources given to maintaining a cell’s ribonucleoprotein system than its 
genetic code.  
 
Scientific Relevance of Barbieri’s Model 
The falsifiable assumptions of the Ribotype Theory are undeniably its most important 
aspects from a scientific standpoint and could serve to provide direction for modern cellular and 
molecular biological research. Barbieri argues that these falsification tests were beyond the scope 
of biology at the time because they would require “detailed elucidation of the structure and 
function of the ribosome components, a comparative analysis of the eukaryotic and prokaryotic 
ribosome biogenesis, and a precise account of what produces the transport of the eukaryotic 
ribonucleoproteins from nucleus to cytoplasm” (1986). Today, however, biology may be close to 
                                                 




a point where it can test this view. In response to a question on the matter of falsification tests for 
his theory, Barbieri (1986) provides the following response: 
 
Question 20: Do you regard falsification as an essential attribute of a respectable 
scientific theory? If so, what predictions does the ribotype theory make which 
could be falsified in the future? 
 
[Response:] Some falsification tests should come from the study of ribosome 
biogenesis. The theory implies that the mechanisms which shift the 
ribonucleoproteins from nucleus to cytoplasm are intimately associated with the 
biogenetic processes, and a detailed comparison of 70s and 80s biogenesis should 
reveal if that is indeed the case. It should be possible, for example, to demonstrate 
that eukaryotes could not survive with 70s ribosomes because they would be 
unable to export them to the cytoplasm.  
Other falsification tests may become possible when the function of most 
or all ribosomal proteins will be known and the significance of the differences 
which exist among various species will be clarified. This should also add much 
more substance and content to the relationship between ribotype and cell-type that 
is at the basis of the theory.  
Finally, we can entertain the idea that one day the manipulation of 
ribosomal genes may produce ribosomes which are not just variants of the 
existing types but which form a class of their own. In this case the theory predicts 
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that we would have the basis for creating in vitro a different type of cell, a really 
new form of life.  
 
Barbieri’s response explicitly points out grounds for testing scientifically the plausibility of the 
evolutionary roles of ribotypes. He predicts that eukaryotes could not survive with genes for 70s 
ribosomes; modern labs may now be capable or very nearly capable of testing this with 
recombinant DNA technology and methods available for making transgenic eukaryotes—
consider the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae as a potential model organism for this experiment. 
The relative ability of such a transgenic organism to survive could be easily measured against 
non-transgenic individuals of the same species.   
In response to a question about quasi-replication, Barbieri notes that, while it has 
somewhat of a science-fiction flair, such a concept could be tested through the reconstitution in 
vitro of natural and artificial ribonucleoproteins (1986). The quasi-replicative ability of 
Barbieri’s ribosoids is a critical component of their plausibility as codemakers. Experimenting 
with the hypothesis that such characteristics of ribonucleoproteins would emerge in prebiotic 
earth conditions prior to self-replication would perhaps be the most direct falsification test of the 
Ribotype Theory. Secondly, in his final response to the question, note the proposal for 
investigating the possibility of creating synthetic life. Creating synthetic life has not seen much 
significant laboratory attention since Miller and Urey’s famous “prebiotic soup” experiment. 
Protocell simulations have been developing in recent times, however (Hanczyc, 2011). These 
simulations model how primitive cell-like bodies might have looked and behaved in the early 
stages of chemical evolution with conditions such as HCN polymer abundance. Such existing 
simulation techniques could be coupled with the reconstitution of natural and artificial 
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ribonucleoproteins in a modern version of Miller and Urey’s experiment to test the Ribotype 
Theory and the RNA World Hypothesis by extension. As a founder of synthetic biology, 
Stéphane Leduc (1911), said over a century ago,  
 
The synthesis of life, should it ever occur, will not be the sensational discovery 
which we usually associate with the idea. If we accept the theory of evolution, 
then the first dawn of the synthesis of life must consist in the production of forms 
intermediate between the inorganic and the organic world--forms which possess 
only some of the rudimentary attributes of life, to which other attributes will be 
slowly added in the course of development by the evolutionary action of the 
environment.  
 
Connecting the Ribotype Theory to Barbieri’s Overall Semiotic View 
 Barbieri’s biosemiotic model differs notably from the Peirce-Sebeok model in that 
Barbieri’s model entails scientifically testable predictions about the characteristics and 
biogenesis of ribosomal complexes in cells. It argues for the recognition of ribotype as separate 
from genotype and phenotype and proposes that the evolution of a primitive cellular 
ribonucleoprotein system may have been the impetus for the formation of the genetic code.  As 
such, Barbieri sees fit to equate such a system to a potentially natural “codemaker.” Similar to 
the Peirce-Sebeok model in which ribonucleoprotein systems occupied a central role as 
interpreters, Barbieri’s model is triadic. However, Barbieri seems to avoid the question of the 
origin of biologic meaning with this view of ribotypes as natural codemakers.  Thus, the issue of 
interpretation as pointed out in regard to the Peirce-Sebeok model is apparently resolved with 
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what Barbieri refers to as a separation of the semiotic threshold—the origin of semiosis—from 
the hermeneutic threshold—the origin of interpretation (2007).  
Some concerns for applications of Barbieri’s Ribotype Theory both in science and as a 
semiotic theory may need to be considered further. First, the most glaring limitation of the theory 
is that “ribotype class differences” only serve to justify the very general distinctions of organisms 
at the basic level of cellular organization which already exist. While it might be exceptionally 
useful for reframing understanding of the nature of a cell and thus for biological education, the 
ribotype theory cannot be applied with confidence for species’ distinction in a similar manner to 
genotype and phenotype in classical genetics. In addition, while Barbieri anticipates the critique, 
he still leaves open the question of how to interpret the fact that ribonucleoproteins are encoded 
by the genotype and expressed in the phenotype of the cell. Perhaps most significant, Barbieri’s 
semiotic model is weaker than the Peirce-Sebeok model in that it rests upon an unverified 
understanding of the evolutionary roles of cellular components. If it can be supported, it may 
result in a stronger biosemiotic claim, and its strength lies in its applicability to scientific 
research. Whereas the Peirce-Sebeok model makes fewer assumptions about the nature of the 
cell and simply strives to make sense out of the scientific knowledge currently available, its 
reach and potential impact are also weakened by its lack of scientifically testable components. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The basics of contemporary approaches in biosemiotics to making sense of living systems 
have hopefully been sufficiently presented.  Perhaps the most important distinction to make 
between current biologic practice and biosemiotics is that, in the latter, recognition of purposeful 
functions in living systems is viewed not as a fault or fantasy of human conception, but as a 
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justified awareness of an essential and emergent characteristic that is common to all life—both 
microscopic and macroscopic. Barbieri’s unique semiotic model has also been analyzed against 
the more common Peirce-Sebeok model, and it has been shown that Barbieri’s Ribotype Theory 
is applicable to scientific research—namely, in origin of life simulations that would parallel 
Miller and Urey’s experiments. In general, one of the most significant effects of a biology 
backed by biosemiotics could be a sophisticated justification of research guided by a search for 
purpose in living systems. For example, in the context of biosemiotics, Barbieri’s Ribotype 
Theory calls for a further investigation of the purpose of a cell’s ribonucleoprotein system; if 
purpose is similarly associated with all biological structures and systems, every aspect of life 
calls for investigation with renewed vigor. The danger, of course, is that such a biology may get 
lost trying to contextualize meaning where none exists. Furthermore, it would likely struggle to 
handle the increased risk of introducing bias in formal research. 
In no way does this paper attempt to argue for a reformation of formal scientific or 
biologic methods of research. Rather, this project is an attempt to foster discussion of the roles of 
science and philosophy, and whether there is to be any overlap therein. Furthermore, it is an 
attempt to alert biologists to the developing field of biosemiotics and some of its potential merits 
as a budding area which calls for deeper scientific inquiry. Many questions, therefore, remain 
unanswered. Is it worthwhile to breakdown the modern divide between science and the 
humanities, and if so, in what respects? To what extent can non-scientific bodies of knowledge 
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